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Erosion of Democracy
TYRIE

A.

BOYER*

I am always perplexed by those who claim to support democratic
government while simultaneously doubting the ability of the electorate
to select judges. Such an attitude is not unlike professing to be a Christian while doubting the divinity of Jesus Christ, or claiming allegiance to
Judaism while doubting the authority of the Ten Commandments.
In my view it is inconsistent to give the people the power to elect a
President who has the authority to send our sons and daughters to their
death in foreign lands, and to elect a Congress with authority to affect
our daily ives by the passage of laws, both popular and unpopular, and
to possibly destroy our businesses and futures as a result of the impact of
taxes, while denying that those same voters are competent to select
judges to administer and interpret those same laws and actions.
Justice Overton, of the Supreme Court of Florida, in his many
speeches on the subject, supports so-called merit selection and retention
of judges on the basis that, until the Jacksonian Era, judges were
appointed rather than elected. He somehow extrapolates from that position that we should return to the custom of our Founding Fathers by
abandoning judicial elections. Applying the same logic, most of our
present electorate would be disenfranchised. As we all know, prior to
the Jacksonian Era, and long thereafter, women, African-Americans, and
citizens who did not own property were not permitted to vote. Further,
the qualified property holders were required to pay poll taxes for the
privilege of voting. Does Justice Overton, one asks rhetorically, recommend that we also reinstate those practices of our Founding Fathers? Of
course not.
Over the last forty years, I have occasionally debated the subject of
an elected judiciary versus an appointed one, ever since the emergence
of what then was referred to as the "Missouri Plan." The arguments in
favor of appointing judges have traditionally been: (1) that the selection
of judges should be removed from politics; (2) that it is undignified and
humiliating (and too much hard work) to seek a judicial position via the
elective process; and (3) that the citizens lack sufficient information and
knowledge (meaning competence and intelligence) to select judges.
I will address those arguments in reverse order. First, I do not
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agree that the citizenry is too incompetent or uninformed to select
judges. While mistakes will occasionally be made in selecting judges,
mistakes are also made when electing executives and legislators. Furthermore, the citizens have a right to be wrong. Unelected nominating
commissions (who have their own agenda) do not. There is simply no
basis for the proposition that voters are any less able to evaluate judicial
candidates than they are capable of evaluating executive or legislative
candidates. Although the issues may be different, the process is the
same. In choosing legislators and executives, each voter rightfully looks
at the candidate's past record and attempts to select the candidate whose
views most closely coincide with his own. In selecting judges, the same
criteria apply. The voter looks at the candidate's record for honesty and
integrity, competence and ability, intelligence and industriousness, and
most importantly, fairness and judicial temperament.' Voters are just as
capable of ferreting out those attributes in a judicial candidate as they
are the attributes and convictions of legislative and executive candidates.
Many argue that it is improper for a judicial candidate seeking election to take a stand on issues which may come before him or her as a
judge. I agree with that argument; as I have demonstrated, taking such a
stand on substantive issues is not necessary in judicial elections. Indeed,
one of my primary objections to the so-called "merit selection and retention" process is that the members of the Judicial Nominating Commissions are appointed by individuals who have political agendas. Those
commissioners know, when they are appointed, what is expected of
them. The voters have no voice in the matter whatsoever. The commissioners, who owe no allegiance to anyone other than their appointive
authority, have agendas of their own. They meet, interview, and select
the nominees "out of the sunshine." The commissioners look for nominees to support their agenda. Because they are sophisticated in the process, the commissioners do not ask questions that directly interrogate the
potential nominee regarding burning current issues, such as abortion and
race relations. Their questions, however, are framed so that it is impossible for any intelligent person not to know the implications of those
questions and, of course, to seek to respond accordingly. If such questions are to be asked, is it not more appropriate to have them posed to a
judicial candidate in the presence of those who will be judged, the public, rather than in a closed room in the presence only of a small committee with a private agenda holding in their hands the future of the
individual seeking nomination?
I have, personally, on more than one occasion, sought judicial posi1. Judicial temperament means the ability to hear all sides of an issue, and politely, but
firmly, make a decision free of prejudice or bias.
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tions by way of both the elective process and the selection process. I
can state, without equivocation, that there is more "politics" (in its most
derisive sense) involved in the selection process than in the election
process.
In an election, the candidate seeking office selects a campaign
treasurer to coordinate the raising and disbursing of the funds necessary
for any campaign. The candidate then exposes herself or himself to the
scrutiny of the general public for observation and interrogation, usually
along with the other candidates. Thus, the electorate has an opportunity
to both evaluate the qualifications of the candidate and to compare that
candidate with the other candidates.
On the other hand, one seeking a judicial office by way of "merit
selection" must first prepare and submit a long and complicated application, self-servedly anticipating those qualifications which are preferred
by the members of the unelected nominating commission. Next, the
candidate seeks out friends and relatives of the various commissioners
and convinces them to contact the commissioners on his or her behalf.
The commissioners then apply their own criteria and agenda during the
elimination process. The commissioners' criteria and agenda may well
be entirely different from that of the population in general and may or
may not be based upon the qualities desirable in a good judge. The few
lucky survivors are then "interviewed" (interrogated) by the commission
members, each of whom will be seeking candidates who fulfill his or her
own personal expectations and who will be acceptable to the Governor.
Finally, three names, none of which have been democratically selected,
will be submitted to the Governor as "qualified." The Governor,
restricted to those three nominees, then makes his appointment.
The merit selection system contains the potential for abuse. If the
members of the Nominating Commission (who unlike the Governor are
not elected) desire the appointment of a particular candidate, they need
only submit that candidate's name along with two obviously unqualified
candidates or two who are known not to meet the Governor's expectations. In this way, the Commission can cram a single nominee down the
Governor's throat. Of course, the opposite can (and does) also occur.
The Governor simply lets it be known who he or she desires to appoint,
whereupon the Commission ensures that that person's name is among
the nominees. The Governor makes the appointment and the other two
nominees, regardless of their qualifications, "go hence without day."
The Governor is insulated in the event that the appointee turns out to be
a less than ideal judge. The Governor is insulated because the nominee
was submitted by the Nominating Commission. The proof of the pudding is that one may often learn who will replace a particular judge by
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visiting the lawyers' lounge in the courthouse, even before that judge
submits his or her resignation.
There is another important consideration. Americans have traditionally understood that few people are perfect; therefore, they are willing to forgive small transgressions. In the elective process, a candidate
who has been active in public affairs or elsewhere, but who may have
along the way stubbed his or her toe, has the opportunity to explain any
past transgressions, and it is left to the voters to compare him or her with
other candidates. By contrast, in the "merit selection" process, the commissioners must insist that every candidate be "squeaky clean" in order
to avoid any embarrassment to themselves or to the Governor. Furthermore, a situation or event which the commissioners may consider disqualifying may well be viewed as an attribute by the voters. The voters,
however, have no say in the matter. Through merit selection, those who
have been active during their lives have little chance of being nominated
by a Nominating Commission, because certainly the best way to avoid
making any mistakes is to never do anything. Thus, nominees tend to be
either members of large law firms who have devoted their lives to corporate practice, having little contact with either the people or the type of
law which come before real life judges, or professional Assistant State
Attorneys who, in most instances, know little or nothing about civil law
or the "rough and tumble" of surviving in a private general law practice.
It is virtually indisputable that Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and
Thurgood Marshall, because of their real-life activities, would never
have survived Florida's "merit selection and tenure" process. Though it
has been argued that those great Justices would also have failed in the
elective process, there is a great difference. In the elective process, the
candidate has an opportunity to publicly respond to innuendos and accusations. Further, the electorate has an opportunity to compare the candidate with other candidates. In the merit selection process, although,
theoretically, the electorate can remove a sitting judge, the public has no
way of knowing who will replace the judge nor whether that successor
will be an improvement.
Notwithstanding the current fever to appoint, rather than elect all
judges in Florida, my experiences around the United States have convinced me that, as a whole, Florida is blessed with the best judges in the
nation. Of course, the Florida judiciary has its share of despots and
incompetents. And while some judges are not intellectually honest, I am
aware of none who is consciously dishonest. Our excellent judiciary, as
a whole, may well be attributable to the fact that our trial judges are
elected. Because there is a general tendency for appellate judges to be
selected from the trial bench, the result is that, although appellate judges
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are appointed, in many instances those judges have been initially
selected by the elective process which is indelibly, though perhaps
unconsciously, imprinted in their memories.
I have a simple response to those who claim that the elective process is too demeaning, time-consuming, and expensive. Anyone who
feels that it is beneath his or her dignity to shake a hand and request a
vote is apt to exhibit the same feelings of superiority while presiding in
the courtroom, and such a person may become arrogant and abusive.
Though happily few in number, such judges do, in fact, exist in Florida
today. It is also disturbing that critics complain that campaigning takes
too much time. The position of judge requires more than forty hours per
week, and judges are not compensated for overtime. If an individual
feels that campaigning is too time-consuming and fatiguing, then perhaps he or she will feel the same way about investing the time necessary
for the performance of judicial duties.
Judges should possess the qualities of humility and equality. Nothing instills those virtues as well as meeting the day shift of factory workers at 6:00 a.m. as their shift commences and the graveyard goes off
duty. A candidate, while shaking hands, looking the voters in the eye,
and asking for their vote, learns (often for the very first time) what life is
really about. There is no such "levelling process" in the so-called merit
selection system.
Although emphasis is most often placed upon the selection process,
the process of retention is equally important. The elective process furnishes a method for removing, via competitive elections, despotic, lazy,
incompetent, or dishonest judges. This is especially important to litigants and lawyers, those most concerned. While we do have a Judicial
Qualification Commission, its record, particularly with reference to despots on the bench, has not been impressive. The merit retention process
has been equally ineffective. First, it has been extremely difficult to
reach the public on the issue of retaining a particular judge. Second, it
has been almost impossible to articulate why a particular judge should
not be retained. The result is that judges are virtually never rejected,
even if they have demonstrated complete unworthiness for their position.
The other side of the coin is that the system may be completely
unfair to sitting judges. For example, recently in'a sister state, a political situation resulted in a drive, to which the sitting judges had no way
of responding. That drive resulted in the removal of virtually all the
incumbent judges, notwithstanding that many of them were excellent
judges and had done no wrong. Those sitting judges were, in effect,
forced to run against ghosts. An election process would have permitted
each judge to face his accuser (or opponent) in an open, robust, and
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hearty debate, giving the interested parties (lawyers, litigants, and potential litigants-all of whom are voters) an opportunity to compare the
incumbent with his accuser. What could be more democratic and
American?
Another major flaw in the so-called merit selection and retention
process is the lack of accountability. Every individual in government
should be accountable to someone. Such is particularly true with regard
to the judiciary, which is arguably the most powerful of the three
branches of government. Legislators can pass laws, executives can
attempt to enforce laws, and the people, by referendum may even amend
the Constitution. However, the judiciary has the power to declare any
legislative or executive act unconstitutional and is the ultimate authority
in construing the Constitution. We are all acquainted with judicial interpretations and engraftments. For example, the word "must" becomes
"may," the word "shall" becomes "maybe," and the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution becomes a mandate for the'separation of
church and state, though I challenge anyone to point to one word in the
Constitution to that effect. The point is that, in a democracy, officers
having such power should be accountable. However, only through the
elective process, whereby judges become accountable to the people, is
there any accountability. Nominating Commissions are appointive, and
accountable to no one. Certainly nominees are not accountable to the
Nominating Commissions. Because the Governor, theoretically, has no
input in the selection process, the ultimate nominee has no responsibility
to the Governor, and the Governor is therefore not accountable to the
people for the nominee's future performance.
To summarize, those advocating the elimination of the democratic
elective process in favor of the so-called merit selection and retention
system can engage in a parade of horribles to prove their point. With
mature thought and experience, however, a countervailing parade of horribles can be demonstrated to exist in the present merit selection process.
My strongest argument is simply that I have faith in the American
people, who, despite occasional errors, have demonstrated their ability to
govern themselves.
I have addressed the issue of whether the elective process or the
appointive process is the superior method for selecting judges. Those
defending the appointive process often argue that while the system may
not be perfect, it is subject to improvement. I immediately embrace that
argument. Clearly, if Florida is going to continue to use or expand its
merit selection and retention system, then there are many changes and
improvements which can and should be made. That, however, is beyond
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the scope of this presentation. Nevertheless, rather than experimenting
with an appointive system, I would recommend embracing the superior
method of judicial selection, elections.

